Some Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning by Buchanan, Bruce G. & Headrick, Thomas E.
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
11-1-1970 
Some Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal 
Reasoning 
Bruce G. Buchanan 
Thomas E. Headrick 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Legal Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal 
Reasoning, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 40 (1970). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/867 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Some Speculation About Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning"
Bruce G. Buchanant
Thomas E. Headrick$
Although the computer has worked its way out of the laboratory and
into common experience, lawyers have made slim progress towards find-
ing useful computer applications. Research in artificial intelligence, a
branch of computer science, has illuminated our capacity to use computers
to model human thought processes. This research suggests that computer
science may assist lawyers in both the study and performance of their rea-
soning processes. In this Article we will argue that the time has come for
serious interdisciplinary work between lawyers and computer scientists to
explore the computer's potential in law.
Interdisciplinary work between the lawyer and the computer scientist
has floundered on the misconceptions that each has of the other's discipline.
As a result, no one has yet attempted computer programs incorporating
complex techniques of legal reasoning. Even efforts in legal information
retrieval have been hampered by these misconceptions. In retrieval, lawyers
have viewed the computer as, at most, a storehouse from which cases and
statutes might be retrieved by skillfully designed indexing systems. Com-
puter scientists, on the other hand, have operated with a conception of law
as a collection of facts and "correct" legal principles; they have assumed
that the computer can be most helpful to the lawyer if it can retrieve the
right answers quickly. But the lawyer rarely looks for, or even expects,
clear answers. More often than not, he searches his data base-treatises, ar-
ticles, statutes, cases, and other materials-in order to construct legally
acceptable arguments in the pursuit of one or more objectives. Likewise,
the computers have information processing capabilities that are overlooked
in the common conceptualization of computers as information storage de-
vices. Work in artificial intelligence has been proceeding for more than a
decade on efforts to model information processing after human thought
1 The authors acknowledge with thanks the friendly criticism of Professor John Barton, Stanford
Law School, and Professor Edward Feigenbaum, Computer Science Department, Stanford University,
but assume full responsibility for the errors of fact and judgment that remain. The research was sup-
ported mainly by the Advanced Research Projects Agency and a grant from I.B.M. to Stanford Uni-
versity for studies in law and computer science.
t B.A. ig6i, Ohio Wesleyan University; M.A. 1965, Ph.D. 1966, Michigan State University.
Research Associate, Computer Science Department, Stanford University.
$ B.A. 1955, Franklin and Marshall College; B.Litt. 1958, Oxford University; LL.B. ig6o, Yale
University. Vice-President for Academic Affairs, Lawrence University.
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patterns. So far, the efforts in legal retrieval have given little consideration
to the possibility that computers might operate on the legal data base the
way a lawyer does. Yet the work in both fields-law and computer science
-suggests that the computer modeling of legal reasoning would be a fruit-
ful area for research. In this Article we speculate about the dimensions and
possible directions of this research. Under the most promising of outcomes,
interdisciplinary research could lead both to a greater understanding of
the legal reasoning process and to the design of machine methods for per-
forming parts of it.
The prospect of using computers to model legal reasoning processes
is likely to prompt a typically lawyer-like response: So what if we under-
stand legal reasoning or legal argument formation better? The effort to
create programs to simulate legal reasoning processes should have at least
two benefits: It should prompt more systematic study of legal problem-
solving, and it should advance knowledge of the problem-solving capa-
bilities of computers. Knowing more about the ways in which lawyers
search and manipulate the legal data base might lead to improving the
lawyer's skill at his work. We recognize the possibility that the work of
many lawyers might actually involve little use of the legal data base for
argument construction or dispute resolution. Until our knowledge about
how lawyers really operate is firmer, however, we believe our expectation
is plausible and acceptable.
I. RoUTNE LEGAL REsEARcH AND THE COMPuTE
It is useful to start with some conception of a legal research system to
give us some notion of where the current legal retrieval systems might fit
in a more comprehensive legal reasoning system and how current artificial
intelligence research might contribute to the design of a system capable of
performing both the routine and some creative aspects of legal research
A legal research program might perform many routine duties. At
minimum, the computer should be able to retrieve statutes, case language,
case summaries, and other legal data, to answer questions about that in-
formation, and to communicate in a natural (not cryptic) manner with
lawyers. Automated information storage and retrieval systems have been
developed that can store millions of records and search them more thor-
oughly and rapidly than a person can. Money is one major limiting factor in
developing this computer skill. Not only is it expensive to gather, codify,
I. For a general discussion of the problems of designing intelligent systems see Churchman &
Buchanan, On the Design of Inductive Systems: Some Philosophical Problems, 2o BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.
3i (i9q6). For a discussion of some of the benefits and problems arising from using computers in
law, especially in predicting judicial decisions, see Stone, Man and Machine in the Search for Justice,
16 STAN. L. REv. 515 (1964).
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and store large amounts of information, it is also expensive to run the com-
puter programs that access all the information.
A few legal retrieval systems have been or are being developed! These
systems have two basic components: a data base and an indexing system.
Usually the data base is the full text of statutes or cases, that is, the primary
legal sources. The ingenuity in designing such a system lies in formu-
lating the index, which provides the means of retrieving the legal material.
Several methods have been designed. In the University of Pittsburgh-Aspen
System, the only one commercially operational, the index is produced by
the computer, which sorts and counts word frequencies in the legal
sources.3 For example, state statutes are read into computer storage. A fre-
quency count is then made of all but the most commonly used words to
compile an index of the words in storage. The searcher accesses the data
base by requesting all statutory provisions containing the one or more
words that he designates.
Slightly more complex are the association-factor retrieval systems that
attempt to build search systems on the joint appearance and proximity
of words in the same document. Words that appear together in the same
document beyond some established level of statistical significance are as-
sumed to be logically related to each other. Thus a user of such a system
can retrieve all references to a given word and to words related to it at
some specified level. For example, words related to "automobile" at a .75
level (or higher) in a particular document may include "car," "truck,"
"transportation," and "highway," in which case the user interested in auto-
mobiles can see these related references as well. Two experimental projects
have based their indices upon this assumption.
One system of this type, developed at George Washington University,
makes a set of comparisons and calculations to produce an index that as-
sociates any one term with a number of related terms The specification
of a term by the user first produces a list of related terms. The computer
then locates documents with the main terms and the related terms and,
2. In our discussion of retrieval systems we are indebted to a review of past and contemporary
efforts prepared by Clifford Weaver, who was a Stanford Law and Computer Fellow in the summer
of 1968. For other recent surveys see Comment, Automated Legal Information Retrieval, 5 HousroN
L. REv. 691 (1968); and Note, Science-Computers-The Use of Data Processing in Legal Research,
65 MIcH. L. REv. 987 (1967).
3. The University of Pittsburgh-Aspen System is described in several places, including: Horty,
The "Key Words in Combination" Approach, 1962 MoDERn UsEs OF LoGic IN LAW 54; Horty, Use of
the Computer in Statutory Research and the Legislative Process, in A.B.A., Coam'uTRs & THE L&w
48 (x966); Kehl, Horty, Bacon & Mitchell, An Information Retrieval Language for Legal Studies, 4
Coa. OF THE Ass'N FOR C-suvrsiNo MAcH. 380 (i96i); and promotional materials obtainable from
Aspen Systems, Webster Hall, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
4. Stiles, The Association Factor in Information Retrieval, 8 J. Ass'N FOR CO1,su-rNG MAC.
27X (x961); Eldridge & Dennis, The Computer as a Tool for Legal Research, 28 LAw & CoN-Eat.
PRoB. 78, 92 (1963). For a description of later work at George Washington University see Kayton,
Retrieving Case Law by Computer: Fact, Fiction and Future, 35 GEo. WASm. L. REv. z (1966).
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by using previously determined computations of the relevance ratios be-
tween terms, assigns a relevance value to each document produced.
A somewhat similar system is under development by the American
Bar Foundation in cooperation with I.B.M.' In this system the computer
analyzes the frequency of co-occurrence. Words that co-occur frequently
and with somewhat consistent intervening word space are assumed to be
logically related. From this basic computation the computer constructs
a grid with each word assigned a point. The expectation is that a section
of the grid would contain words closely linked with each other, and that
the machine would thereby have developed a thesaurus. That is, each word
is stored in the thesaurus close to the other words of the text that are logi-
cally related to it (and to each other). The user initiates a document search,
then, by naming one of the terms in the thesaurus. The computer searches
for that word and others (or combinations of others) close to it in the grid
to produce the references that mention any of these related terms.
These processes aid a researcher in finding all the documents thar might
have some conceivable relationship to the problem under search. They are
machine-produced aids to his imagination. The attempts at computing
document relevance help the researcher to design a strategy for reading
the output. These systems, however, do not aid the researcher in the more
important task of processing the output to achieve his desired objective.
Whether simple or complex, all of the legal retrieval systems proceed
on common assumptions about the strategy of the legal researcher. First,
they assume that he can be led to relevant material through the identifi-
cation of dominant single concepts or generalizations. In other words, he
can pick a set of key words that are relevant to his research objective, and
these will lead him to the cases or statutes he needs. Second, they assume
the researcher proceeds by identifying all the statutes and cases he can
find that mention the designated concept. They tend to leave out other
filters that the lawyer may use. Some are obvious, like age of a case, jurisdic-
tion, the procedural context, and key facts. Others are less so, like the way
a court characterizes an issue, matters to which judicial notice is given,
cases followed or distinguished, and many others. Third, they all assume
that the computer can do nothing more than fetch the material from its
memory and that the researcher must digest what is produced in order
to construct his argument or advice. All of these assumptions are question-
able. They ignore both the objectives of legal research and the cognitive
potential of computers. Lawyers can use more than routine help, and com-
puters may be able to provide it.
5. Dennis, Status of American Bar Foundation Research on Automatic Indexing-Searching Com-
puter, 1965 MODFeN UsEs oF Lornc IN riE LAw 131; Eldridge, The American Bar Foundation Project,
1965 MoDERN Uses oF LoGic IN THE LAw x29; Eldridge & Dennis, supra note 4.
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A more sophisticated program would be able to "understand" and pro-
cess some (but not necessarily all) of the material about the items in its
files. It could read stored items to find the best ones for the lawyer instead
of merely pulling out the items that use any or all of the key words he has
specified. It could know that Judge Banks did not necessarily hear only
cases involving banking institutions, for example, or that a case about the
misdeeds of a parent corporation was not about child abuse. Some under-
standing of the meaning of sentences, that is, some knowledge of seman-
tics, is necessary to avoid such blunders and to provide more help to the
lawyer.
This semantic capability is a more difficult task for computers than is
key-word searching. Although there has been substantial computer re-
search in the area of natural language communication, the present sys-
tems are limited by the difficulty of giving a computer program enough
semantic processing power to understand English sentences. The programs
that have been developed all work with restrictions either on the domain
of discourse or on the number of facts and concepts that can be related.
For example, one program works on algebra word problems in English;'
another works with English sentences, mostly upon part-whole relations
between objects;' others have attempted to relate facts, expressed in En-
glish, about any subject or set of concepts,' but these can so far handle only
a limited number of facts and concepts. In restricted subsets of English,
some existing programs can carry on respectable dialogs with humans.
For example, a program has been written for performing the groundwork
of a psychiatric interview Another program can conduct tutorial sessions
with students on any restricted topic about which it has been instructed
-for example, the special theory of relativity or the interpretation of a
particular line of poetry1 Many other examples are cited in a recent sur-
vey article. 1 Thus, for the more routine language skills that the research
system demands, computer capability has been demonstrated, at least for
restricted problems.
The practical problems of applying these pioneering programs to as
6. Bobrow, Natural Language Input for a Computer Problem-Solving System, in SEMATcrc
INFORMATION PROCESSING 135 (M. Minsky ed. 1968).
7. Raphael, SIR: 4 Computer Program for Semantic Information Retrieval, in SEMANTIC INFOR-
MATION PROCESSING 135 (M. Minsky ed. 1968).
8. Quillian, Semantic Memory, in SEMANTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING 216 (M. Minsky ed.
1968); Black, A Deductive Question-Answering System, in SEMANTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING 354
(M. Minsky ed. 1968).
9. Colby & Enea, Heuristic Methods for Computer Understanding of Natural Language in Con-
text Restricted On-Line Dialogues, I MATH. Biosci. x (1967).
Io. Taylor, Automated Tutoring and Its Discontents, in ELIZA: A Skimmable Report on the
ELIZA Conversational Tutoring System (E. Taylor ed. March 1968) (MIT Education Research
Center, Cambridge, Mass.); Weizenbaum, Contextual Understanding by Computers, io Com. oF THE
ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACH. 474 (1967).
ii. Simmons, Natural Language Question-Answering Systems: 1969, 13 CoM. oF THE Ass'N
FOR COMPUTING MACH. 15 (1970).
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large and complex an area as legal research are formidable indeed. More-
over, because the range of topics, situations, and concepts covered by law
is virtually unbounded, a formal encoding of cases and laws probably
could not preserve the richness, the suggestiveness, or the fertile ambi-
guities of the English language. Yet computer science is making progress
with natural language communication, and its long-range relevance to
legal problem-solving is clear.
These problems are still not in the same class as the problems of raising
the computer from a quick librarian to a sophisticated information pro-
cessor. More difficult problems lie ahead for lawyers, or anyone else hoping
to let computers participate in some of their tasks. While it is relatively
easy to say what routine skills would be desirable in the program and to
point to relevant computer research, it is not so easy to say what a lawyer
does as a creative researcher (at least not in exact terms), and it is even
harder to conceive of the computer's potential. Even so, the current re-
search in artificial intelligence suggests that both problems deserve fur-
ther inquiry.
II. GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Understanding and codifying the decisionmaking processes of law-
yers presents one of the greatest challenges of the proposed research. Apart
from the computer program that could emerge, one of the payoffs of this
research is the insight that lawyers will gain into their own modes of
thinking. Such a payoff has been realized in other fields where computer
scientists prodded specialists for their rules, which were then put into the
developing program." Lawyers, like many specialists, can be expected to
respond to questions about their methods, their rules of thumb, and their
decision rules with doubts about the propriety of the questions. In the ab-
sence of any reason to speculate on how they carry on their work, they
now apply complex sets of rules without being much aware of the rules
themselves. But demands for an intelligent computer system to aid law-
yers cannot be met unless lawyers themselves are able to articulate their
methods and thought processes.
Computer scientists working in these areas share two assumptions
about human problem-solving: (i) problems can be broken down into a
set of subproblems, and (2) the solution to any subproblem requires a
series of decisions that are governed by decision rules. As mentioned earlier,
humans who solve complex problems often cannot articulate the princi-
ples by which they simplify their problems or the decision rules by which
12. For example, organic chemists have come to understand their own analytical rules better as
a result of artificial intelligence research constructing a computer program to perform analyses of
some experimental chemical data. See notes 29-2o infra.
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they solve the subproblems. It would not be necessary for a lawyer to be
able to articulate fully his procedures before computer research in legal
problem-solving can begin. It would be necessary, however, for him to be-
lieve that the methods of solution can be made precise.
Many problems are likely to be encountered in searching for program-
mable rules used by lawyers. Experience in artificial intelligence research
has shown that this is a formidable barrier to the creation of any intelli-
gent computer system. Searching for statements of rules used by an indi-
vidual in solving problems or constructing arguments is bound to be un-
comfortable or unsetding. It is hard work, and it often causes the subject
of the inquiry to rethink his fundamental reasons for holding one set of
principles rather than any other. It may even point out the lack of sub-
stantial rational grounds for many decision rules.
Even if an individual lawyer is willing to attempt this exercise, another
set of problems stands in the way of creating the computer program. Law-
yers who are unaccustomed to the rigorous demands of computer program-
ming languages will feel frustrated with the gap between what they want
to say and what the computer language lets them say. This frustration is
common among programmers as well. Its cause does not lie in the restric-
tions on the content of the rules that are to be programmed. Instead, the
cause of the frustration is usually the disparity between the natural state-
ment of the rule and the formal statement within the programming lan-
guage. The problem lies in representing the rules so that the computer can
use them.
There is another important problem that is well known to those in
the field of artificial intelligence: Even after one machine-readable rep-
resentation has been found for a class of problems, one has no assurance
that it provides the computer with the best method of handling all prob-
lems of that class. Many times success or failure in solving a complex
problem will hinge on representing the problem correctly at the start'
So the search for rules used by a lawyer will not be over as soon as he can
make some statements about his priorities for legal principles and his
heuristic rules1 4 He must also be prepared to recast these statements into
13. For example, the so-called "mutilated checkerboard" problem is easy in one representation,
but difficult in another. The puzzle is this: When trying to cover a checkerboard with dominoes, each
of which covers two squares, it is obvious that removing one corner square from the board renders
the solution impossible. Can it be completely covered, however, when two diagonally opposite corners
are removed? The statement of the problem suggests that actually laying dominoes on a checkerboard
might be the way to find out. However, this is the wrong representation. The one that makes the so-
lution trivial emphasizes the red-black coloring of the board and the fact that each domino must cover
both a red and a black square. Now it becomes obvious that a checkerboard with two red squares re-
moved cannot be covered with dominoes. The solution, given the right representation, is equally triv-
ial for human or machine problem-solvers.
14. Heuristics (or heuristic rules) are rules of thumb that usually contribute to solutions of
problems without in any way providing a guaranteed method for solution. In a chess game, for
example, one heuristic for winning is to control the center of the board. There is certainly no guarantee
that the player controlling the center will win; yet center control has contributed to winning enough
games that it is a guideline for every player.
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other representations. Perhaps a more formal representation will facilitate
programming; perhaps using more general concepts will increase the
range of legal problems that can be solved; or perhaps using more specific
concepts in some places will make some problems almost trivial.15 At
any rate, this is an important and difficult consideration for the designer
of a system that does legal reasoning.
III. Two MODELS OF CREATIVE LEGAL RESEARcH
We know too little about the styles and structures of legal research
strategies. Although lawyers do legal research and solve legal problems
day in and day out, systematic analysis of this process has been rare. 8 As
a consequence, our models of the legal research process are incomplete and
oversimplified. We have no solid base of data on the legal research process,
and, of course, have not attempted an exhaustive description of legal
thought processes. The two models discussed here have been derived
from introspection and tested upon our colleagues. They provide a frame-
work for looking at lawyers' underlying thought processes by describing
a portion of their cognitive tasks.
In the first model, the factual situation has been set, certain events have
happened, and a client wants to know what his rights, remedies, and risks
are. In the second, a client is looking for guidance for a future action, and
the client can control the facts or events somewhat to suit his legal needs
as assessed by the lawyer. For both models we have assumed that prob-
lem identification has taken place: The lawyer has already delimited his
area of concern by concluding that he has a tax problem, an agency prob-
lem, a contract problem, or some other. He is ready to concentrate on one
area of law. How he arrived at that point involves a complex search of
the space of laws and legal problems. The existing and proposed legal re-
trieval systems model a part of this search process, but, as we indicated, at
present they leave out other parts.
A. Model I: Interpreting the Facts and Law to a Client's Benefit
Suppose a client has been involved in an automobile accident or he has
in some way broken off a contractual relationship, and someone is threaten-
ing to sue him. The events have already occurred. First of all, the lawyer
would rarely be looking for a direct answer that his client is liable or not
liable. Rather, he would seek to construct a legal argument that would
justify the actions of his client. The lawyer would attempt to generalize
15. For example, mentioning red and black squares and not just adjacent ones in the mutilated
checkerboard problem described in note 13, supra, makes the solution obvious.
16. Two useful accounts, both clearly based on introspective study and case analyses rather than
empirical investigation, are C. Momus, How LAwymas THINx (1938) and E. LEvi, AN IN onUeTiON
To LE .AL REAsONING (1949).
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the already-occurred factual situation and select the legally relevant facts.
He does this by reference to legal rules or concepts that make some facts
relevant and others irrelevant. He looks at the facts and checks them against
potential linkages of rules that would lead to the result he favors and avoid
the result he disfavors. Although he may start with one conception of the
facts, he may end up emphasizing other facts because of the way in which
he constructs a legal argument (that is, a linkage of concepts to the desired
legal result).
The skillful advocate strings together rules in a way that justifies the
result he is seeking and at the same time encompasses the factual occur-
rence in a way that makes the rules he has selected appear to be the ones
best applicable to the situation. His research strategy is to identify the
string of rules that both leads to a desired result and plausibly encompasses
a set of facts that accounts for what has happened to his client.
This model may be clarified for the reader without legal training if
we spell out more concretely some of the lawyer's possible approaches to
the problems presented by the factual situation in, for instance, a simple
contracts case. In Boston Ice Co. v. Potter,7 an ice company sued to ob-
tain the purchase price of ice it had delivered to a customer. Two years
earlier that customer had switched its business from Boston Ice to a rival
company. Boston Ice had then purchased the rival company and resumed
delivery to the customer without informing him of the change. The cus-
tomer refused to pay when he finally learned the identity of his supplier.
The goal of a lawyer representing Boston Ice would be to secure a judg-
ment against the customer for the value of the ice delivered. By one line
of argument, he might try to establish that the plaintiff and defendant had
contracted with each other. The facts show no direct negotiations between
the plaintiff and defendant leading to an express contract, so he would have
to argue that a contract should be implied from the situation. Perhaps our
lawyer would reason that delivery of goods was an offer and their use an
acceptance, and then search for cases with that holding. If he turned up
some cases fitting this generalization, he would then want to know whether
anything in the nature of either the delivery or the goods distinguished
those cases from his client's. For instance, assume he found a case hold-
ing that a water company's delivery of water constituted an offer and its
use an acceptance even though a new resident in a house had never com-
municated with the water company. That case might be distinguished
on a variety of grounds: the presence of an established network of pipes
in which the water company had invested; the need to deliver water by a
single closed system in order to assure water quality; the existence of a
17. 123 Mass. 28, 25 Am. R. 9 (1877).
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state law requiring all dwellings to have running water; or because the
water company's monopoly gave the new resident no choice of alternative
supply. Our lawyer would have to face one uncomfortable fact in his
client's situation: The defendant had previously broken off his dealings
with the plaintiff and turned to a competing ice house. If he had known
who was supplying him ice, he would likely have terminated the deliveries.
Our lawyer might fear that cases supporting the principle of implied offer
and acceptance are insufficient because they cover factual situations that
do not include this element. He would then look for a less factually re-
strictive line of cases.
He may find some cases that suggest that an assignment of a contract
is valid under some conditions. This validity, he will learn as he reads a
few cases, applies to contracts that involve fungible goods or that do not
involve some element of personal service in their performance. Ice would
appear to meet the first condition, but this case may well come within the
personal services exception. Was the defendant receiving ice alone, or ice
and some element of personal services? Did he previously terminate his
arrangement with the plaintiff because he found the service unsatisfactory ?
The questions suggest that our lawyer would need to re-interview his
client, and possibly take the defendant's deposition, to determine if he
could pin down facts that would place his client within this line of cases.
Our lawyer might pursue other avenues, but this account is complete
enough to illustrate elements of the argument construction process stressed
in Model I: specification of an objective; an initial statement of facts; search
for cases offering a rule that leads to the desired legal consequences on the
basis of those facts; evaluation and comparison of the facts and legal issues
in the different cases; testing of the given facts against a rule; acceptance,
rejection, or modification of the rule, or the resulting search for additional
facts. For these processes the lawyer does not need all possibly relevant
cases; he needs only a solid sample that indicates how previous courts have
usually reasoned and ruled in analogous situations.
B. Model II: Recommending Actions that Satisfy a Client's Goals and
Avoid Unfavorable Consequences
In the second model the lawyer is no longer involved merely in the ar-
gument formation process, but also is concerned with risk assessment with
respect to future actions. He starts by identifying the typical situation where
the law would sanction the client's proposed actions. Then he checks the
law and the potential facts of his client's situation to see if there are any
reasons why these desired typical solutions are inapplicable. If he finds some
reason, he would then attempt to restructure the existing facts, the legal
November x970 ]
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generalizations of them, and the proposed action to develop a better fit.
He would continue this restructuring and testing until he finds the for-
mulation of existing facts, proposed actions, and legal consequences of them
that minimizes the risks and maximizes the sought objectives. Model II
differs from Model I in that the facts become variable to a greater extent
and the objectives are not simply a favorable legal result, but also combi-
nations of legal, business, and other goals. The Boston Ice situation will
again illustrate the lawyer's method.
Suppose the ice company, upon buying a rival company, asks our law-
yer what risks it runs if it simply continues supplying the other company's
customers. He has some control over the facts since he can suggest actions
his client might take. These actions will improve the client's chances of fit-
ting his situation within a legal rule leading to favorable legal conse-
quences: in this case, prompt payment of bills and minimization of the
need for litigation to collect bad debts. For instance, the safest legal posi-
tion for his client would be to make express contracts with the new cus-
tomers. He might, therefore, issue express offers to them and solicit clear
acceptances before beginning deliveries. But this course entails some risks.
Some proportion of the customers may decline the offer and turn else-
where for ice. On the other hand, f the client merely sends a letter an-
nouncing the purchase of its rival's business, he encounters the risk that a
court may rule that to be insufficient to create an obligation from the new
customer. Our lawyer might make other suggestions, each entailing some
measure of legal risk, which must be balanced against business risks. The
trade-offs may not be clear. The lawyer and the client must combine judg-
ment as well as they can.
How does the lawyer proceed? Working within the general conceptual
framework of contracts, he can think of a number of actions his client
might take. From his legal data base he can extract commentary and
cases that help him predict how a court is likely to react to cases involving
each of the possible sets of facts. Some sets of facts will appear safer for
the client than others; the lawyer will go through the process of matching
facts and generalizations about facts in the cases and treatises with the
imagined fact-sets involving the client and potential customer litigants to
determine whether the fit is good enough to dissuade the customers from
risking a lawsuit. His assessments of the varying strengths will enable him
to make a rough ranking of the possible actions in order of their legal
risk. Although the overall process differs from the first model, with its
unpaid bill and pending litigation, many of the subprocesses involving
manipulation of the legal data-facts, rules, and their consequences-are
similar.
[Vol. 23: Page 40
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IV. THE THoUGHT PRocEssEs OF A LAwYER
The existing retrieval systems help only on the periphery of the pro-
cesses described in both models. They retrieve cases and statutes that are
potentially relevant to some of the facts under consideration. Ideally the
lawyer would not want from the computer mere lists of statutory provi-
sions and cases related to legal concepts that may, after he wades through
them all, help him put together an argument or design a new search. He
would want a system that would produce legal arguments-the end prod-
ucts of his research.
To begin designing such a system, we have to know more about the
mental processes a lawyer uses to solve his legal problems. Only in this
way can we begin to structure the processes so that a computer could imi-
tate them. We can identify some of the lawyer's mental steps from our
models. Certainly there are many others.
First, the lawyer establishes and pursues a goal. He seeks some satis-
factory legal result for his client. There are some crucial steps in this pro-
cess. One is his perception of linkages, of how a set of facts calls into play
a rule, which then calls into play another rule or set of consequences either
compatible or incompatible with his goal. Another is his decision about
whether an indicated legal result is compatible or incompatible with his
goal. One set of mental processes, therefore, concerns establishing goals,
finding linkages from facts to rules to legal consequences, and measuring
at various stages in the research process the compatibility of a set of con-
sequences with the established goal.
In the Boston Ice litigation example, the lawyer had a clear objective:
payment to his client for the ice. He tested, in succession, the applicability
of several possible legal characterizations of the facts-express contract,
implied contract, valid assignment. Each involved a linkage from facts
through a rule to legal consequences. He accepted or rejected a specific
linkage on the basis of how well the facts of his client's case fit with other
cases that had applied the rule and resulted in certain consequences. In that
process, he inevitably read cases that, though based on similar facts, applied
rules that lead to undesirable consequences. He sought the rejection of
those rules by distinguishing the facts.
Second, there is the process of fact recognition and characterization.
The facts suggest some possibly applicable rules; the rules and the cases
using them suggest the relevance and importance of certain facts. The
rules that are being explored will influence the decision about which facts
are relevant. Working with these interrelations is one aspect of recogniz-
ing relevant facts in legal problem-solving.
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A related aspect of legal research concerns the use of other cases and
their rules as bases for arguments in a client's case. There is no uniform
way in which a judge or a lawyer records the facts of a case. Facts may be
events like the collision of A's car and B's car; they also may be relation-
ships like C was a passenger in A's car. Moreover, what passes for a fact
in one case may become a question of legal dispute in another. For instance,
in the Boston Ice case the prior termination of a contract was treated as a
fact; in another it may be the crucial point at issue. In addition to the usual
ambiguities of language, one often finds legal characterizations of events
and relationships treated as facts for the case at hand. Two cases might
have involved identical events, but in one the court described events, and in
the other another court summarized them with a legal conclusion. The per-
ceptive lawyer will recognize the similarities and differences between the
facts of the two cases.
A third process that a lawyer performs is rule selection, that is, identi-
fying which one of several rules applies to a factual situation. One sim-
plified model of legal reasoning portrays a collection of facts classified
by legal rules from which specified legal consequences flow. In concep-
tion, the legal rule is an if-then statement: If facts Ai . . . Ax, then legal
consequences Bi . . . Bx. In practice, however, the rule that may apply
rarely emerges so neatly. In Boston Ice, the account of the past behavior
of the parties could be used to support the application of two different rules
leading to opposite legal conclusions; that is, the absence of express con-
tract or the presence of a valid assignment of a contract. The legal problem-
solver often differentiates in some way between two rules that might apply
to the same behavior and events. He thus has some way of resolving rule
conflict. The form of differentiation chosen has to do with his objectives,
with the relative weight he attaches to the various facts, and with the in-
ferences he draws from some facts on the basis of his knowledge of addi-
tional facts. In effect, he finds or constructs another rule to resolve the rule
conflict.
A fourth process concerns analogies. A lawyer usually prefers to fash-
ion arguments built from cases whose facts are similar to the facts with
which he is working. If he cannot find such cases, he resorts to finding cases
with facts that are analogous to his own in formulating an argument. One
method of finding an analogy is through generalization of a legal rule.
Although in one case a rule was applied to a specific set of facts, the lan-
guage in which the court stated the rule may deductively allow its applica-
tion to a different set of facts. The rule may use words that are capable of
encompassing a variety of events, actions, or relationships. In our Boston
Ice example, for instance, the lawyer examined whether the case of water
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delivery would hold for ice deliveries. In addition, analogies are found by
generalizing on the factual situations
V. CURRENT CoipuTER WoRK. AND LEGAL THOUGHT PROCESSES
The four legal problem-solving processes we have isolated are the fol-
lowing: (i) finding conceptual linkages in pursuing goals, (2) recogniz-
ing facts, (3) resolving rule conflicts, and (4) finding analogies. Some
computer science research in the areas of artificial intelligence and simula-
tion of cognitive processes bears directly on these creative aspects of legal
research. We will review some of these developments briefly and draw
attention to possible applications to legal research. One particular pro-
gram, named "Heuristic DENDRAL, ' 0 will be discussed in some detail to
illustrate the present capability of a current program. By this illustration,
we hope to convey the present power and limitations of artificial intelli-
gence methods.
The task of the Heuristic DENDRAL program is to make inductive
inferences from experimental data to explanatory hypotheses in a com-
plex area of science. The data are analytic data resulting from fragmen-
tation of organic chemical molecules within a mass spectrometer. The
explanations the program seeks are models of the original chemical com-
pound that produced the data. Using general principles, the program tries
to relate the facts (data) to an hypothesis that clarifies the facts or shows
why the facts should be expected. It attempts to reason from the facts to
the most plausible conclusion, given general principles governing the re-
lation of facts to conclusions."
iS. For example, assume a case holding that a corporate officer who had access to information
that should have forewarned him of the fraud of a potential creditor was liable to his stockholders.
From this case it could be argued, by analogy, that the airline officer who had access to information
about impossible flying conditions but authorized a flight that took people to their death was also
liable for negligence. The factual situations would be made analogous in this instance by isolating
the notion of access to information that should have forewarned the defendant.
i9. The Heuristic DENDRAL program was conceived by Professors Joshua Lederberg and
Edward A. Feigenbaum at Stanford University after C. West Churchman of the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley suggested studying the design of inductive systems. The program was mostly
written by Georgia Sutherland, Allan Delfino, and Bruce Buchanan. It currently runs on the IBM
36o/67 computer at Stanford. See Buchanan, Sutherland, & Feigenbaum, Rediscovering Some Prob-
lems of elrtificial Intelligence in the Context of Organic Chemistry, in 5 MACH. INTELLIGENCE 253
(B. Meltzer & D. Michie eds. 1970).
2o. The Heuristic DENDRAL program has been discussed in detail elsewhere. See id. The pro-
gram itself is conceptually simple and can be described briefly for those intersted.
The first phase of the program accepts the facts (ie., the analytical data) and attempts to make
come sense out of them by deciding which facts are relevant to the problem and constructing a plan
for its solution. This first step has been labeled the planning phase of the program for this reason.
The data come from a mass spectrometer, an instrument that bombards the molecules of the sample
with electrons and collects the resulting fragments that have become charged in the process. The mass
spectrum is usually presented to the chemist as a bar graph with the x-points representing masses of
the fragments that were charged, and thus recorded. Each y-point of the mass spectrum represents the
relative abundance of fragments of the corresponding mass. The problem is more difficult than
fitting together pieces of a jigsaw puzzle because not all the fragments produced are recorded-only
the positively charged ones are. Also, not all the recorded points represent results of a simple frag-
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As most treatises on induction specify, the general approach to this prob-
lem is through the steps of analyzing the facts, constructing plausible hy-
potheses, and evaluating (verifying, validating) the hypotheses. The initial
problem of explaining the data is thus broken down into three subprob-
lems. Each of these, in turn, is little more than a set of subproblems. At the
lowest level, the subproblems are so straightforward as to be called de-
cisions.
The success of Heuristic DENDRAL, as with almost all nonnumerical
problem-solving programs, lies in its ability to define the totality of possible
solutions and search the totality efficiently for the best one. An important
part of this task is constructing a search plan carefully enough to reduce
the size of the search space2' and still include the correct solution in the
space. Although there are many variations on this generate-and-test strat-
egy, its fruitfulness for other artificial intelligence programs suggests that
it may be a useful approach to legal applications.
As in chemistry, a legal problem has an almost countless number of
possible solutions, some better than others. Heuristic DENDRAL explores
mentation of the molecule. Many secondary and tertiary processes occur after fragmentation but before
recording. Moreover, as with any method of collecting data-including surveys and personal ob-
servation-it is virtually impossible to avoid errors of one kind or another or to record only the data
that will turn out to be the most significant. Usually it is a mistake to try.
So the first thing the program does is to apply some "common sense chemical rules" to get rid
of the most blatantly spurious pieces of data. The program attempts to mirror the chemist's first ad-
justment of the data in this first stage. It rejects data that are either obvious mistakes or that are ir-
relevant to the solution.
The next part of the planning phase scans the filtered mass spectrum looking for patterns that
indicate one or another class of solutions. For example, the class of molecules known as ethers exhibit
different characteristic patterns than the alcohols. This planning process is grounded in almost exactly
the same rules of mass spectrometry as the chemist uses for these classes of compounds.
The plan that results from the first phase of the program isolates important features of the final
solution, without filling in the details. Although many chemical molecules may be compatible with
the plan, only molecules that contain the structural features indicated by the plan will be considered
plausible explanations of the data. In other words, the plan indicates a general class, within which
must lie the solution of the original problem. One such plan would indicate the class of ethers that
have five carbon atoms on either side of the oxygen atom.
The second phase of the Heuristic DENDRAL program generates specific instances of mole-
cules within the framework of the plan. Instead of relying on something as vague as "intuition" to
produce specific hypotheses, the program has a systematic generator. The virtue of this structure
generator is that the program can construct hypotheses in a way that guarantees that every instance
of the general class will be generated, if needed, until the class is exhausted. It also guarantees that
no hypothesis will be considered twice and no equivalent hypotheses will be generated. The result of
the second phase is a list of models of molecules compatible with the plan. If the plan is very specific,
the list is very short; in many instances the plan is so good that only a single model fits its constraints.
The last phase of the program tests the candidate solutions (the models of molecules) produced
by the generator in an attempt to find the best explanation of the data. Some of the consequences of
each hypothesis are predicted and tested against additional data--either parts of the mass spectrum
ignored earlier or the results of an entirely different experiment, a nuclear magnetic resonance spec-
trum, for instance. If the prediction is inconsistent with the data, that hypothesis is rejected. The
candidate explanations that remain are then ranked on the basis of how well they explain the original
data. The conclusion of this whole process is the choice of the best solution (or the best set of solu-
tions) to the original problem.
21. A search space is an organized, possibly infinite, set of possibilities to be considered for the
solution of a problem. Chess playing programs, for example, decide which move is best by exploring
several of the possible moves and responses to them in the total search space. When a search space
is very large, as in chess, a computer program must decide which parts of it to explore in detail and
which to ignore.
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the space of possible explanations by generating larger and larger pieces
of chemical molecules, checking for plausibility each time. If some similar
method could be devised for exploring the space of legal arguments sys-
tematically, the problem of selecting the best solution(s) could be reduced
to deciding whether the alternative paths were likely to lead to a reason-
able solution. The plan constructed by the chemistry program points to
a small part of the total space, namely, the part that seems most likely to
contain the best solution. Possibly a planning program could look at the
data of a legal problem to suggest constraints on the search space. One
such constraint on the solution space that lawyers determine initially is
the category of the problem, which is what we have referred to as problem
identification. Heuristic DENDRAL is doing what a lawyer does when
he identifies his problem in a generic way and constructs a list of plausible
(or possibly applicable) rules, which then, by another set of thought pro-
cesses, are tested by a closer look at those rules as applied in previous cases,
and the facts in the client's case.
A. Pursuing Goals
The goal of the Heuristic DENDRAL program is to find an explana-
tion of the given empirical data. As in many legal problems, this goal is
only implicitly defined. The program works from the given data toward
the final solution, using its knowledge of the properties of the solution.
For example, the DENDRAL solution must be a model of an organic
molecule that is consistent with the analytical data. The solution must also
account for many (or most) of the prominent data points. The program
tries to reach its implicitly defined goal by reasoning from the given data
toward the goal. When it is obvious to the program that a path in the solu-
tion space does not lead to the goal (i.e., does not lead to a molecular model
that satisfies the criteria of solution), that path is abandoned. Often, several
alternative paths must be traversed to the end, each terminating in a candi-
date solution. In such cases, post facto measures of acceptability are ap-
plied to determine which candidate is best. The candidate exhibiting the
most properties of the implicitly defined goal is identified as the best solu-
tion to the problem.
In the "General Problem Solver," a widely known computer program
written by Newell, Shaw, and Simon,22 the goal is explicit at the start.
The program is expected to find a line of reasoning that takes it from the
premises of a problem to the stated goal. For example, given the set of
axioms of truth-functional logic and a theorem to prove, the program
22. Newel & Simon, GPS, A Program that Simulates Human Thought, in COmPUTERs AND
THOUGHT 279 (E. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman eds. x963).
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tries to find a series of rule applications that transform an axiom into the
theorem. This program was designed to solve puzzles of the form "How
do I get there from here using the means given ?"2a
In a similar way, the lawyer takes sets of facts and attempts to apply
legal rules or concepts to those facts in order to achieve a favorable result
for his client. Problems that fit Model I above also seem amenable to solu-
tion by the goal-seeking strategy of the General Problem Solver. Theo-
retically, at least, one can conceive of a legal problem-solver that would
contain legal rules, ways of testing their application to given fact situa-
tions, and a way of measuring progress toward the goal. After someone
prescribed a set of facts and the desired results, the problem-solver would
compare those facts (or subsets of them) to the situations under which
the stored rules apply, apply the appropriate rule, and compare the legal
consequences with the lawyer's goal. Gradually, then, it could build an
argument leading to the desired result.
A computer program has been written in the context of investment
portfolio selection that solves problems like those under Model II.4 The
task of this program is to select an investment portfolio that helps the
client realize his investment goals. Here, as in the legal context, the prob-
lem is to advise actions the client can take to help him meet his goals.
The program processes information on the economy, industries, and in-
dividual companies to produce a list of acceptable securities. Basically the
program applies some general rules to filter out a set of possible invest-
ments; it then applies to this set some particular rules related to the inter-
ests of the investor to produce, finally, a balanced portfolio for the client.
Conceivably, the same process might be applied to Model II legal prob-
lems, where the lawyer attempts to realize a client's objectives by legal
routes that minimize adverse legal consequences.
Admittedly, it requires a substantial jump to convert Heuristic DEN-
DRAL, the simulation of the investment trust officer, or the General Prob-
lem Solver into a program that can handle even some of the complexity
of law. Yet even if, for the purposes of experiment, this complexity were
artificially circumscribed, it might be useful to compare some variations of
one of the goal-seeking programs operating on a legal problem with the
processes a lawyer uses to solve the same problem. The comparison would
probably lead to a refinement of our legal research models.
23. For example, given the starting locations of three cannibals and three missionaries on one
side of a river and the goal of having all cannibals and missionaries alive and well on the other side
of the river (no more than two persons are allowed in the boat at a time, and the cannibals must
never outnumber the missionaries on either side of the river if the "alive and well" clause is to be
satisfied), the program tries to find a series of boat trips that transforms the initial state into the goal
state.24. Clarkson, A Model of the Trust Investment Process, in COMPUTERS A") THouG T, supra
note 22, at 347. The program was written with the purpose of modelling the thought processes of




No existing program shows that computers can successfully recog-
nize and reinterpret factual statements, the second of four legal problem-
solving processes that a sophisticated legal program should have, but one
is at least conceivable. The ability to find and characterize facts is an im-
portant but elusive element of human problem-solving, in scientific work
as well as in law. Computer work has been started; much more remains
to be done.
Fact recognition is the first step of the Heuristic DENDRAL program.
Given the experimental data, the program, like any scientist, must dis-
tinguish the "real" data points from the spurious. It separates erroneous
data and uninformative pieces of data from the facts that are important for
solving the problem. The program can also add pieces of data that "should"
have been in the original set based on inferences from theory and the data
actually appearing. Here, and throughout the program, the decisions are
based on the decision rules used by experts. They are usually grounded in
theory, but often include heuristics.
With a good deal more theory (or more risk), the program could
eliminate data points it decided were not useful for the problem even
though they passed the general test of legitimacy. The rules for usefulness
would be applied at this point in the program in much the same manner
as the rules for spuriousness. Although the program would save some time
at later stages because there would be fewer facts to analyze, the small sav-
ings and the higher risk of excluding data necessary to arrive at the best
set of solutions both seem to make such filtering undesirable for this pro-
gram. Thus the Heuristic DENDRAL program does not eliminate as
many data points as it might while looking for the "real" facts relevant
to a problem. But the mechanisms for discarding useless facts already exist
and could theoretically be applied to reduce a data base to a manageable
size.
Classifying facts and factual situations is also an important part of
creative legal research. A concept-formation program written by Hunt and
Hovland suggests a means of devising classification rules for a given set of
objects. This program models a psychological experiment in learning
where an individual is presented with a series of objects described as A's and
not A's, and he is asked to devise a rule explaining the classification. The
program has three phases of operation. Ordering routines take note of
common characteristics of the members of a class. Description routines
identify common relationships among the characteristics each member
of the class may have. Finally, solution routines try conjunctions and dis-
25. Hunt & Hovland, Programming a Model of Human Concept Formation, in ColMPUprraas AND
THoU T, supra note 22, at 310.
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junctions of these common relationships as classifying rules. The concept-
formation problem is thus broken into distinct subproblems.
Recognizing commonality and differences in factual situations and for-
mulating concepts that link the commonalities and distinguish the differ-
ences is a substantial part of the process of legal argument formulation.
This process occurs when a lawyer compares cases that deal with the same
concept but have differing results. For instance, when research turns up a
series of cases dealing with contributory negligence, it becomes important
to weave an argument that links together those factual situations in which
the court ruled there was contributory negligence. At the same time, it
helps to find the common elements in the cases in which the court held
there was no contributory negligence. With an extension of the routines
used by Hunt and Hovland, one can think of a future computer program
that looks at a large set of cases together with their legal conclusions to
determine the common elements in the factual situations linking the facts
to the conclusions.
C. Resolving Rule Conflicts
In heuristic programs it is common to find conflicts in rules and the
decisions made from them. Heuristic programs must have some mechanism
for handling conflicting decisions, because many if not all of the judg-
mental rules are neither logically complete nor internally consistent. Find-
ing conflicts between principles underlying decisions is also an important
aspect of legal reasoning. Unfortunately, little computer science research
has been undertaken on this problem.
Currently most of the programs for which this is a problem, including
Heuristic DENDRAL, avoid conflicts with a simple trick. They base their
decisions on the first rule or "strongest" rule that applies to a given situation.
Or, if the program can tolerate ambiguities, all the rules are applied, with
a decision being made later about which consequences to accept. When
Heuristic DENDRAL consults its rule table to formulate a plan, for
instance, every relevant rule is applied. For this reason the program often
formulates conflicting plans, all of which are explored.26 One way the pro-
gram resolves this ambiguity is to build models of each class and attempt
to reduce the conflict later by testing predicted consequences of the specific
instances of each plan. A second way it can resolve the conflict is to look
at additional experimental data (if it is available) and apply additional
rules to them.
A recent program written to allow the computer to learn to play draw
26. For example, the rules may indicate that both secondary amines and tertiary amines-two
mutually exclusive chemical classes-should be generated.
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poker uses the strategy of acting on only the first rule which is the strong-
est one that applies to a situation2 When this program is in its learning
mode (when it is learning to play well), however, it has the capability of
recognizing conflicts between its rules and reordering the rules or modify-
ing them so that the first relevant rule in the table will be the correct one to
apply. In learning, it builds a set of generalizations for good draw poker
play from experience-either with or without advice from an expert (hu-
man or machine). When the program finds that the generalization it has
just made conflicts with an existing rule, it resolves the conflict by either
weakening or strengthening the rule. Exceptions to a rule can be noted,
rules can be generalized by subsuming them under a broader rule, and
overly general rules can be made more specific. For example, if the existing
rule tells the program to bet high for three of a kind but its experience on
the last hand has shown that three deuces were not worth a high bet, then
it would amend its three-of-a-kind rule to exclude three deuces. Here there
are straightforward methods for recognizing rule conflicts and eliminating
them. Whether these methods apply in complex legal situations is an open
question. An attempt to extend these methods into the legal problem-
solving area might yield some interesting information concerning the
ways in which lawyers and judges actually resolve rule conflicts.
D. Finding and Using Analogies
The fourth area where the legal reasoning program needs to build on
computer research is in finding and using analogies. Here, too, the existing
computer work has been in relatively simplified and formal domains.
Analogical reasoning in law needs the richness of the English language,
with great numbers of legal rules and factual situations cataloged in mem-
ory.
Computer work on finding and using analogies is rather sparse, in part
because of the magnitude of the problems. One important program has
been written to solve the common intelligence test problem of choosing a
geometrical figure that exhibits the same relation to a given figure as two
other given figures." It finds the pair of figures, one given and one from
a set of possible answers, that stand in the same relation to each other as
a oiven pair of figures. The program has some built-in knowledge of the
properties of geometrical figures and relations between figures. It searches
for analogs among these concepts. This is a standard problem on IQ tests
27. D. Waterman, Generalization Learning Techniques for Automating the Learning of Heur-
istics (Stanford University Artificial Intelligence Memo AIM-io2, July 1969) (available from the
Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, Springfield, Virginia).
28. Evans, A Program for the Solution of Geometric-Analogy Intelligence Test Questions, in
Si MANTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING 271 (M. Minsky ed. 1968).
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or entrance examinations, and was chosen partly for this reason, since it
is so often used to discriminate intelligent problem-solvers from less intelli-
gent ones.
Adding analogical reasoning to Heuristic DENDRAL in the future
will be at least a two-step process. First, it should be able to use stored
analogies, provided by a programmer, in order to solve new problems. After
that, the program should be given the ability to find the analogies for it-
self.29
Discovering analogies in any field is a much harder problem than
merely using them. Presumably the computer would be given a new prob-
lem and solutions to several old problems. It should be able to postulate
some analogies and apply analogs of the known solutions to the new prob-
lem. As in the geometry program, the program would need some limited
sets of concepts among which it could search for analogies."0
A legal reasoning program constrained to analogies along similar pre-
specified dimensions would be excessively artificial. Many of the brilliant
legal analogies between factual situations or principles are based on rela-
tions one probably would not have thought to put into a computer system.
Yet, even a list of mundane relations, used in the same way as the geometric
analogy program 3 uses geometric relations, could further the reasoning
power of a program immensely.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described a bit of what lawyers and computer scientists do,
and speculated about a possible relationship between the two. Artificial
intelligence may have something to contribute to law along this dimen-
sion. The only way of finding out whether the relationship will be fruitful
is to explore it seriously.
It is premature to state categorically that computers will be used as aids
in the process of legal reasoning, or even that they should be. It is hard even
to imagine a consensus on the import of the research we propose. Certainly
lawyers at one extreme will already have written off computers as a waste
of time and money, while some at another extreme will be so convinced
of the computer's potential as to feel threatened by its future encroach-
a9. The analogies that it could use, and possibly find for itself, would be of the form "ethers
behave like amines." If the program were able to carry on a dialog with the chemist about the aspects
of amines and ethers for which the analogy holds true, it could build suitable ether rules. For instance,
the rule table would give the program the four or five amine rules. It could postulate that exactly the
same rules hold for ethers, and then modify them as a result of the dialog or further experience.
30. Knowing the higher order principle that analogies can be found between types of chemical
atoms, for instance, the chemistry program could postulate that oxygen behaves like nitrogen. After
checking this hypothesis among the known solutions it should be able to state firmly that ethers
behave like amines.
31. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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ment upon their work. Between these extremes are numerous positions,
some more plausible than others. Such a system could be developed only to
die of neglect; it could survive only in the cloisters of academia; it could
become an occasional tool of some small or large number of lawyers; it
could, conceivably, become a major influence in the practice of law.
The research might lead to major changes in the role of law and lawyers
in our society, to some changes, or to none. By removing the "dog work"
that underlies quality legal service, the computer system might make good
service available to a larger segment of society. Lawyers' conceptions of their
role might change as they gain a wider understanding of the positions
they advocate. Or the computer system might operate in such a narrow
and restricted way that it would miss many possibilities that average lawyers
now readily conceive. Lawyers might rely too heavily on a restricted, and
thus somewhat incompetent, system with a resulting decline in the quality
of legal services. The system might make it difficult to train lawyers for
complex tasks requiring seasoned judgment developed through years of
apprenticeship, because the apprentice's work had been replaced by ma-
chines. Or the system might be so widely available and provide such stable
and usable information that ordinary people might become their own
lawyers. Legal representation might no longer be needed in many disputes.
With courts and lawyers all using the same system, new stability in the
law might be realized. This stability might help or it might hinder the
overall development of the law and its ability to adjust conflict within
society and to serve other ends. The adjustment of law to the computer
might generate demands to rid law of its ambiguities and turn it into a
logically consistent and complete system that would provide clear and
unequivocal answers to all cases.
Control of the system and its programs might confer such significant
power that battles over legislation would shift from the committees and
floors of legislatures to the offices of programmers. The system might be
so expensive that even the most affluent society could not afford it, or it
might save so much legal labor that no society could afford to be without
it. Because of its cost the system might only be available to the wealthy and
would assist them in increasing their wealth. The success of the system
might remove most of the needs for lawyers; its failure might attest to their
value to society, or the research might show that even if the system were
developed it would not help either the lawyers or their existing and poten-
tial clients.
It is possible to speculate, as many have, about an endless succession
of utopias and horrors. The selection of any of these outcomes at this point
can only be based on prejudice, hope, fear, and the like. Overcoming the
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psychological, financial, and technological obstacles to this research is not
a trivial task.
We have surveyed some computer programs that appear to attack non-
legal problems in ways that lawyers attack their own. On this evidence,
we have claimed that it would be worthwhile to explore the potential ap-
plication of computers to legal reasoning. The programs developed in
the course of research in artifical intelligence and cognitive simulation
indicate a potential for computer performance of processes similar to those
at times used by legal problem-solvers. These programs work with pro-
cesses that form part of the lawyer's problem-solving apparatus, or at least,
without benefit of more systematic study of this apparatus, so it seems. An
attempt to extend or apply the programs to simulate the legal problem-
solver should have at least these benefits: It should prompt more systematic
study of legal problem-solving, and it should advance knowledge of the
problem-solving capabilities of computers.
In short, research proceeding in computer science could enhance our
understanding of the processes by which lawyers work and think. So far
lawyers have not attempted to explore its relevance. They should.
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